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WHAT THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES SAY ABOUT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERSUASIVE GOVERNMENT
SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS
L ESLIE GIELOW JACOBS t
INTRODUCTION

In Malaysia , it's a diseased lung. 1 In Thailand, it's skulls floating
behind the smoker.2 In Brazil, it's a dead fetus lying among cigarette
butts. 3 "In New Zealand, it's a gangrenous foot." 4 In the United States,
it's going to be the same type of color graphics, along with pointed warnings, covering the top half of the cigarette package .5 And tobacco labels
are ju st the tip of the iceberg. Alcohol vendors already must include
warnings on their labels, 6 the new national health reform legislation requires that fast food chains post calorie counts on signs and menus, 7 and
proposals continue to surface to mandate "cigarette-style" warnings on a
range of other products because they pose a public health danger. Products targeted for warning labels, both here and abroad, include sugary
sodas, violent video games, cell phones, sun beds, butter, cheese, foods
children consume which contain artificial coloring that may increase
hyperactivity, and vacation travel because it results in global warming. 8

t Profe sso r and Director, Capital Center for Public Law & Policy , University of the Pacific ,
McGeorg e School of Law. Thanks to Abner Greene and Hel en Norton for their helpful comments on
a draft of a related article. Thank s to Mike Claiborne and Rebecca Whitfield for their excellent
resea rch assistance.
I.
Ranit Mishori, Packing a Heavier Warning; Elsewhere, Cigarette Boxes Bear Graphic
Evidence of Smoking's Ill Effects; U.S. labels Will Soon Do the Same, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2009, at
HE!.
2.
Miranda Hitti, Cigarette Warnings: Is Bigger Better?, CBS NEWS.COM,Feb. 6, 2007 ,
http ://www .cbs new s.com/s torie s/2007/02/06/health/webmd/m ain2439660. shtml .
3.
Mishori, supra note I , at HEI .
4.
Id.
5.
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act req uires that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services issue guidelines no later than June 2011 requiring color graphics depicting the hea lth effects of smok ing to accompany label warnings. See Act of June 22, 2009, Pub . L.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).
No . 111-3 1, § 201(d), 123 Stat.1776 , 1845 (2009)(tobecodifiedat
6.
See MICHAELS. WOGALTER,HANDBOOKOF W ARN!NGS669 - 85 (2006).
7.
Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES, March
24, 20 I 0 , at BI, available at http ://www.nyt ime s.com/20 10/03/24/busine ss/24me nu.html.
See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Joe Baca , Rep. Baca Introduce s Legislation to
8.
Make Violent Video Games Sold With Health Warning Label (Jan. 7, 2009) ("Warning: Excessive
exposure to violent video game s and ot her violent media has been linked to aggressive behavior."),
available at http://www.house. gov/ap ps/list/press/ca43_baca/videogame_heal th_010709.html ; Pres s
Relea se, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub . Intere st, CSP! Calls on FDA to Require Health Warning s on Sodas
("To help protect your
(Ju ly 13, 2005), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/200507131.html
wai stline and your teeth , consider drinking diet sodas or water."); Daily Mail Online, Dairy Products
to Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings as Government Uses 'Shock Tactics', MAIL ONLINE,
March 3, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article
-524931/Dairy-products-carry-cigarette -
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Of course, producers protest the labeling requirements and, frequently, succeed in defeating proposed regulation. 9 But sometimes they
don't; and then, increasingly, they go to court, arguing that the Constitution protects the integrity of their commercial message from government
imposed speech. 10 Specifically, cigarette sellers contend that, even if the
purpose is public protection, Congress cannot force them "to disseminate
a Government-drafted anti-tobacco message" or to "stigmatize their own
product on their own packaging." 11 The district court hearing the cigarette sellers' case has rejected this part of their challenge, 12 but the parties
will likely appeal. And other challenges to new labeling requirements
will surely follow.
One may have thought this battle was over, given the ubiquity of
product disclosure requirements and the fact that more cautious and less
eye-catching cigarette package warnings have been in place for over 40
years. 13 Furthermore, even though the Court has elevated product advertising to a category of constitutionally protected speech, early on it signaled that its skepticism would be directed primarily toward regulations
that restricted the free flow of commercial speech 14 and that it would
accord more deferential review to requirements that vendors disclose
15
additional information along with their own speech.

style-health-wamings-Govemment-uses-shock-tactics.html
(England's Food Standards Agency
considered and rejected a proposal to put warnings on cheese and butter); Kate Devlin , Sunbeds
'Sfwuld
Carry Cigarette-Style Health
Warnings',
TELEGRAPH
, June
20, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/5579038/Sunbeds-should-carry-cigarette-style-healthApril
wamings.html; Liane Katz, Call For Cigarette-Style Warnings for Flights, GUARDlAN.CO.UK,
5, 2007, http://www.guardian .co. uk/travel/2007 /apr/05/travelnews.green.cheapflights; SnackCheck ,
The Twenty Worst Snacks , http://www.snackcheck.co.uk/2566/bottom-20 -snacks/ (last visited June
3, 2010) ("In July 2010 , the [European Union] will make it mandatory to put cigarette-style labels on
products that include these colourings [that the Hyperactive Children ' s Support Group recommends
against]."); Posting of Michelle Quinn to The Bay Area, S.F. May Require Warnings About Cellphone Radiation, http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/l 2/23/sf-may -require-wamings-aboutcellphone-radiation (Dec. 23, 2009, 5:40 PM).
9. See, e.g., Press Release , Wash . Legal Found., WLF Opposes Efforts By Food Police
Targeting Soft Drink Beverages, Dec. 16, 2005 (explaining comments filed with Food and Drug
Administration opposing proposed labeling requirement) .
10. See infra Part I.C (discussing recent lower court disclosure requirement decisions).
11. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief '!I'll39, 51, Commonwealth
Brands, Inc. v. United States , 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D . Ky. 2010) (No. I :09-CV-117-M) (plaintiffs include: Corrunonwealth Brands, Inc.; Conwood Co., LLC; Discount Tobacco City & Lottery ,
Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; National Tobacco Co. ; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.).
12. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 , 529- 30 (W.D. Ky.
2010).
13. The 1964 Surgeon General ' s Report on Smoking and Health led to enactment of the
FCLAA in 1965, which required that health warnings be included on cigarette packages . Lindsey v.
Tacoma -Pierce County Health Dep't , 195 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute and its
amendments represented a compromise between health proponents and tobacco interests . NAT'L
CANCERINST., MONOGRAPH
19: THE ROLEOFTHEMEDIAIN PROMOTING
ANDREDUCINGTOBACCO
USE301-03 (2008) .
14. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council , Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 755
( 1976).
15. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 47 J U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
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But things are changing across the free speech landscape. Recently,
the Supreme Court has rendered decisions that interpret the free speech
· Iy to protect commercia
· 116 and corporate 11
guarantee more expansive
speakers from government regulations that restrict their speech. The recurring and unresolved question is whether and how these changes in the
jurisprudence of speech restrictions will modify the authority of governments to achieve their legitimate regulatory objectives by means of information disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. All of
the current Supreme Court justices agree that governments have the constitutional authority to require commercial speakers to publish some relevant facts when the government purpose is to supplement advertising
that would otherwise be false, misleading, or have the potential to mislead consumers. 18 But countering the potential for consumer deception
has never been the only purpose that disclosure requirements have
served. 19 Increasingly, government regulators require disclosure along
with commercial speech to counter the potential for consumer persuasion
as well. That is, governments select information and require its disclosure not only to aid the rational, self-interested decision making of individual consumers, but also to influence the consumer's decision making
in a way that serves a broader public interest. 2 Consequently, that broader public interest may well be reducing demand for the lawful product on
which the information disclosure must appear. In the context of speech
restraints, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that governments may
not constitutionally engage in the "paternalism" of restricting truthful
commercial speech that individual consumers may hear, when the purpose of that restriction is to reduce demand for a lawful product. 21 Left
uncertain is whether the Court's constitutional interpretations that limit

°

16. See infra Part I (discussion of commercial speech).
17. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (pre-election
corporate spending is constitutionally protected from federal regulation).
18. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010) (upholding federal statutory requirement that law firms offering bankruptcy services "include certain
information about its bankruptcy-assistance and related services" because the requirement was
"'reasonably related to the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers"' (quoting
2.auderer, 471 U.S. at 651)); Id. 1343 n.l (Thomas , J. , concurring) (acknowledging the Court 's
"longstanding assumption that a consumer-fraud regulation that compels the disclosure of certain
factual information in advertisements may intrude less significantly on First Amendment interests
than an outright prohibition on all advertisements that have the potential to mislead").
19. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets : Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Assoc iation in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555,
584 (2006) ("[C]ommercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little
to do with the prevention of deception ."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart , 1996 SUP.CT. REV. 123, 125-2 7 (1996).
20. The new cigarette package labeling mandate makes obvious the persuasive objectives that
underpin , at least in part, many disclosure requirements imposed to advance public purposes in the
modem marketplace. lt is indeed difficult to deny that the new labeling mandate is "plainly intended
to deliver a visually striking, attention-grabbing anti-smoking message." Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief'l! 53, Commonwealth Brands , lnc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d
512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-117-M).
21. For a discus sion of the anti-paternalism trend in the Court's commercial speech jurispru dence, see infra Part I.C.2.
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regulators' abilities to restrict commercial speech because consumers
may find it persuasive also apply to contract government discretion to
impose commercial speech disclosure requirements for the same public
purpose of reducing demand and because of the same presumption about
the potentially persuasive effect of unsupplemented speech.
Yet this apparent uncertainty in the commercial speech jurisprudence has an odd and inconsistent counterpart. At the same time that
members of the Court have suggested disclosure requirements imposed
on commercial speech for purposes other than preventing consumer deception may be constitutionally suspect, in the entirely analogous context
of the abortion service transaction, the Court has applied deferential rational basis review to uphold selective and persuasive disclosure requirements that were imposed for purposes other than correcting potentially misleading speech. 22 Although the Court's plurality analysis with
respect to the Free Speech Clause analysis' application to "informed consent" to abortion requirements was terse, the lower courts have parsed,
expanded, and relied upon it.23 In light of the Court's changing jurisprudence, it is not clear what level of scrutiny should apply to the emerging
genre of informational and persuasive disclosure requirements that the
new cigarette labels exemplify. What is clear is that there is no difference
between the speakers' Free Speech Clause rights in the two lines of cases
that should lead to a different judicial analysis of government disclosure
requirements imposed on them. So long as the informed consent to abortion jurisprudence remains unchanged, it is controlling in the context of
commercial speech disclosures. 24 Deferential rational basis scrutiny applies to judicial evaluations of information disclosure mandates imposed
on product labels and other types of commercial speech, even if the government's purpose is something other than preventing consumer deception and even if the information is obviously selected and presented to
persuade.
Part I situates disclosure requirements within the framework the
Court has developed to evaluate government regulations of commercial
speech. Part II describes the different Jaw that courts have developed to
evaluate disclosure requirements imposed on the abortion procedure. Part
III points out that what courts tend to treat as different lines of casescompelled commercial speech and abortion disclosure-in fact involve
the same type of government action imposed on the same category of

22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) ("To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated , but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity
in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.") (citations
omitted).
23. See infra Part Il.B.
24.
See infra Part III.
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speech, and so the Free Speech Clause analysis applied to each must be
the same.
I. THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT MANDA TED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DISCLOSURES

Government entities at all levels mandate that certain information
appear on product labels. These include Congress, 25 a number of federal
government agencies, 26 state Jegislatures,27 state agencies,28 and city
councils and agencies. 29 California voters imposed a labeling requirement by voter initiative. 30 Product sellers have always used the political
process to fight labeling requirements, and have often succeeded.31 Only
fairly recently have they begun to use the Free Speech Clause as a direct
means of challenging information disclosure requirements. 32 These challenges rely both on the Jack of clarity in the disclosure requirement jurisprudence and the trend evident in the speech restraint cases to interpret
the rights of corporate and commercial speakers more expansively to
limit the scope of permissible government regulatory actions.
A. The Disclosure Distinction in the Supreme Court's Commercial
Speech Jurisprudence

Free Speech Clause protection for commercial speech began in the
mid 1970's. Reversing previous interpretations, in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, lnc .,33 the Court
25.
See, e.g., Nutrition Labeljng and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) , 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.l -101.95 (2010) (Food and Drug Admirustration regulations
26.
imposing Food for Human Consumption Labeling Standards); 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.5 (2010) (Department of the Treasury , Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau , imposing labeling requirements for wine); 16 C .F.R . §§ 1201.1- 1420.1 (2010) (Consumer Product Safety Commission prod uct labeJjng standards).
See, e.g., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST& NATURALRES. DEF. COUNCIL,
27.
SHREDDING
THEFOODSAFETYNET (2006), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/shredding
.pdf (reviewing state food safety and labeling laws that propo sed action in Congress would preempt) .
28.
See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC.CODE§§ 32912- 32921 (West 1994) (milk product labeling) ; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 19080--19093 (West 1964) (home furnishings labeling).
See, e.g., 8 S.F. CAL. HEALTHCODE§ 468 .3 (2010) (menu labeling at chain restaurants) .
29.
30.
Proposition 65, which became law as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986, requires businesses to "notify Californians about significant amounts of chemicals in
the product s they purcha se, in their homes or workplaces, or that are released into the environment. "
OEHHA Proposition 65: Proposition 65 in Plain Language!, http://oehha .ca.gov/Prop65/background/
p65plain .html (last visited June 4, 2010).
31.
See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz & Georg e J. Annas , The FDA, Preemption, and the Supreme
Court, 358 NEW ENG. J. of MED. 1883, 1884-85 (2008) (describing efforts by cigarette makers and
drug manufacturers to obtain immunity from state law requirements , including disclosure requirements, through federal law preemption); Dan Shapley, Pennsylvania Allows Hormone-Free Milk
Labeling: Monsanto is lobbying States to Restrict Labeling, THE DAILY GREEN, Jan. 17, 2008,
available at http://www .thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/eat-safe/hormone -free-milk-47011701
#ixzz0f5Mm9Csu.
See, e.g., N.Y . State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health , 556 F.3d 114, 117- 18 (2d
32.
Cir. 2009) (fast food calorie count labels); Nat ' ! Elec. Mfr. Ass'n v. Sorrell , 272 F.3d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 2001) (labeling of products containing mercury); Int'! Dairy Foods Ass ' n v. Amestoy , 92 F.3d
67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (milk hormon e labels).
33.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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held that speech "propos[ing] a commercial transaction" is not "wholly
outside the protection of the First Amendment." 34 The Court explained
that the constitutional protection commercial speech receives is grounded
in the "public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well-informed," and in the "particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information." 35 In other cases the Court
has described "[t]he commercial marketplace" as "a forum where ideas
and information flourish," to which "the general rule" applies, "that the
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented." 36 Still, a majority of the Court continues to acknowledge "the 'distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech. ,,,37
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York,38 the Court established a four-part test39 which both
protects commercial speech because of its "constitutional value" and
recognizes that commercial speech's distinguishing attributes make certain types of content based government regulation more constitutionally
permissible. 40 The Court has described the Central Hudson test as imposing "intermediate scrutiny," a standard between the rigorous strict scrutiny that applies to other speech regulations and the rational basis standard that the Court uses to review regulations that do not implicate the
free speech right. 41 Although a number of justices have criticized the test
as insufficiently protective of commercial speech, at least in particular
contexts, the Court's majority continues to apply it to evaluate regulations that restrict or suppress commercial speech. 42

34. Id. at 760--62 (overruling Valentin e v. Chrestens en, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
35. Id. at 763, 765.
36. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
37. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp . v. Pub. Serv. Comm ' n ofN.Y. , 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)).
38. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
39. Id. at 564 (stating that if the speech is "neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity," the state "must assert a substantial interest ," the restriction must "directly advance" that interest,
and the restriction must not be "excessive ," meaning it cannot survive if more limited means could
accomplish the purpose) .
40. Id. at 561. Specifically, the characteristics that distinguish commercial speech are its
"greater objectivity ," which "justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones ," and its "greater hardiness ," which "inspired as it is by the profit
motive, likely diminishe s the chilling effect that may attend its regulation ." 44 Liquormart , Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion).
41.
Milavetz , Gallop & Milavet z, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010); Loril lard, 533 U.S. at 554 (describing Central Huds on test as '" substantially similar' to the test for time,
place , and manner restrictions ").
42. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367- 68 (2002) (noting that "several
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it
should apply in particular cases ," but nevertheless finding it to provide '" an adequate basis for
decision '" of the case) (quoting Lorillard , 533 U.S. at 554-555)) .
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Soon after its decision in Central Hudson, however, the Court relied
upon the differences between commercial and other constitutionally protected speech to hold that a lower level of judicial scrutiny should apply
to at least certain types of government regulations requiring commercial
speakers to disclose additional information about their products or services than to those that directly restrict or suppress commercial speech. 43
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,44 an attorney challenged the constitutionality of a state disciplinary
rule requiring any attorney advertisement that mentioned contingent fee
rates to "disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or after
deduction of court costs and expenses." 45 His advertisement had stated
that clients would pay no fees if they lost, but it did not disclose that they
would still be liable for the lawsuit's costs .46 The Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint, alleging that, absent the required disclosure, the attorney's advertising was "deceptive" in violation of the
disciplinary rule. 47 The Court upheld application of the disciplinary rule
to sanction the attorney for failing to include the required disclosure .48
The Court explicitly rejected the attorney's argument that "precisely
the same inquiry as determining the validity of [] restrictions on advertising content" should apply to determine the constitutionality of the disclosure requirement. 49 The Court stated that the "[a]ppellant ... overlooks
material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech." 50 The Court distinguished instances in which government mandated noncommercial speakers recite or publicize ideological speech-mandates which the Court has consistently invalidated 51from the situation before it, in which the government required commercial speakers to supplement their own commercial speech with additional
facts:
But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as
those discussed in Wooley, Tomillo, and Barnette . Ohio has not attempted to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein." The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its pre43. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 65 I (1985).
44. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
45. Id. at 633 (alteration in original).
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id. at 631.
48. Id. at 655.
49. Id. at 650.
SO. Id.
51. See id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating government requirement that plaintiff display "Live Free or Die" license plate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right of reply requirement for newspaper); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge recitation and flag salute)).
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scription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in
his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about
the terms under which his services will be available. Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date,
we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench
much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, "waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately
required . .. in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confu. or decept10n.
· ,,52
s10n

However, the Court added:
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate
the advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend
the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But
we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers .53

The Court found the disciplinary rule disclosure requirement in the case
met the rational basis test, which meant that it accepted as reasonable the
state's assertion that the potential harm of deception existed, that the
disclaimer would help to correct it, 54 and that it did not require the means
be closely tailored to achieve this end. 55 The Court also rejected the at-

52. Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651 (alterations in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 652- 53 ("The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be so
misled is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that members of the public are often unaware
of the technical meanings of such terms as 'fees ' and 'costs' - terms that, in ordinary usage, might
well be virtually interchangeable . When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this
case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine
that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.' The State's position that it is deceptive lo employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability
for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability for costs be disclosed. " (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391- 92 (1965)
(alterations in original)).
55. Id. at 651 n.14 ("Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech lo [least
restrictive means] analysis , all our discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recommended disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech. Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements
are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed , we do not think it
appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible means by which the
State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized. Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant's
argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-inclusive' - that is, if it does
not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate . As a general matter, governments are
entitled to attack problems piecemeal , save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental that
strict scrutiny must be applied . The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not such a fundamental right." (citations omitted)).
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torney's claim that its application "would in fact be unduly burdensome
and would tend to chill advertising of contingent-fee arrangements." 56
The Court in 'Zauderer thus planted the seeds for either a broad or
narrow interpretation of its holding. On the one hand, the Court broadly
distinguished between "disclosure requirements" and "outright prohibitions on speech," noting that the former is an "acceptable less restrictive
alternative to actual suppression of speech." 57 It affirmed that the primary
reason commercial speech receives protection is "the value to consumers
of the information," and that, although vendors may prefer not to disclose certain information about their products or services, the extent of
their "constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in ... advertising is rninimal." 58 It also confirmed
that governments may be selective rather than comprehensive in mandating factual disclosures, addressing one problem at a time. 59
On the other hand, and despite the broad language and reasoning
that seem to distinguish between speech restraints and required factual
disclosures, the Court discussed disclosure requirements in the context of
one imposed for the purpose of correcting commercial speech that would
otherwise be deceptive, and included that government purpose in the
articulation of its rational basis test. 60 The Court also noted that, although
listeners' interests are the primary reason the Constitution protects commercial speech, advertisers in fact possess "First Amendment rights,"
and that, ac some point, even disclosure requirements may be "unjustified" or "unduly burdensome" and "might offend the First Amendment
by chilling protected commercial speech." 61
In the 25 years since 'Zauderer, the Court's decisions and the statements of various justices have muddied, rather than clarified, the decision's meaning with respect to the appropriate standard of review for
disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. In Meese v.
Keene, 62 decided one year after 'Zauderer, the Court rejected a challenge
56. Id. at 652 n.15 ("Evaluation of this claim is somewhat difficult in light of the Ohio court's
failure to specify precisely what disclosures were required. The gist of the report of the Board of
Commissioners on this point, however, was that appellant's advertising was potentially deceptive
because it 'left standing the impression that if there were no recovery, the client would owe nothing. '
Accordingly, the report at a minimum suggests that an attorney advertising a contingent fee must
disclose that a client may be liable for costs even if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. The report and the
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court also suggest that the attorney's contingent-fee rate must be
disclosed. Neither requirement seems intrinsically burdensome; and they certainly cannot be said to
be unreasonable as applied to appellant, who included in his advertisement no information whatsoever regarding costs and fee rates. This case does not provide any factual basis for finding that
Ohio's disclosure requirements are unduly burdensome." (citations omitted)).
57. ld.at650-5J&n.14.
58. Id. at 651 (first emphasis added).
59. See id. at 651 n.14.
60. Id. at 651 ("[A]n advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.") .
61. Id.
62. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
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by a California legislator to a federal statutory designation of films produced by the Canadian government as "political propaganda" and the
requirement that he disclose details about his connections to the "foreign
government" producer and details of its required registration with the
Department of Justice pursuant to the statute. 63 Although the case involved a disclosure requirement imposed on core political speech, the
Court upheld the statutory requirements in strong language that distinguished disclosure requirements from prohibitions of speech:
Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion, confusion, or deceit. To the contrary, Congress simply required the disseminators of such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the
propaganda . . .. Disseminators of propaganda may go beyond the
disclosures required by statute and add any further information they
think germane to the public's viewing of the materials. By compelling some disclosure of information and permitting more, the Act's
approach recognizes that the best remedy for misleading or inaccurate speech contained within materials subject to the Act is fair, truthful, and accurate speech. 64

In contrast to its deferential treatment of Congress's "propaganda"
label, the Court in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy6 5 more rigorously reviewed a
state bar's reprimand of an attorney for, among other things, failing to
include a disclaimer in her advertising that explained the meaning of her
specialty designation. 66 The Court's analysis of the disclaimer requirement confusingly mixed references to considerations that it used in Zauderer to analyze the constitutionality of disclosure requirements imposed
on commercial speech with references to considerations that it employs
to determine whether commercial speech restraints comport with the free
speech guarantee. 67

63. Id. at 467, 469. The legislator was not required to place the tenn "political propaganda" on
the film as he showed it to a public audience . The Court nevertheless held that he had demonstrated
injury sufficient to establish standing to challenge the tenn in the statute based upon evidence that
demonstrated that "his exhibition of films that have been classified as 'political propaganda' by the
Department of Justice would substantially harm his chances for reelection and would adversely
affect his reputation in the community. " Id. at 474 .
64. Id. at 481 ("The prospective viewers of the three films at issue may harbor an unreasoning
prejudice against arguments that have been identified as the 'political propaganda ' of foreign principals and their agents, but the Act allows appellee to combat any such bias simply by explainingbefore, during, or after the film, or in a wholly separate context-that Canada's interest in the consequences of nuclear war and acid rain does not necessarily undennine the integrity or the persuasiveness of its advocacy.").
65. 512U.S.136(1994 ).
66. See id. at 139-40 .
67. Most of the case involved review of the reprimand based upon the content of the attorney's advertising , without reference to the possible alternative of including a disclaimer to explain
the significance of the specialty designation . The Court characterized the sanctions in this respect as
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In other cases not directly addressing disclosure requirements, combinations of justices have distinguished ?.auderer in ways that suggest a
narrow interpretation. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, lnc., 68 a
closely divided Court rejected the claim of fruit growers that the mandatory assessments to fund generic advertising violated their free speech
rights. 69 The four dissenting justices would have accepted it, and in the
course of their discussion rejected ?.auderer as precedent for low level
scrutiny of the subsidization mandate:
In speaking of the objecting lawyer's comparatively modest interest
in challenging the state requirement, we referred to protection of

commercial speech as '~ustified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides .... " We said "principally," not exclusively, and proceeded to uphold the state requirement not because a regulation adding to public information is immune from scrutiny, but because the mandate at issue bore a reasonable relation to the "State's interest in preventing deception of consumers," who might otherwise be ignorant of the real terms on which
the advertiser intended to do business. 'Zauderer thereby reaffrrmed a
longstanding preference for disclosure requirements over outright
bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the potential of commercial
messages to mislead by saying too little. But however long the pedigree of such mandates may be, and however broad the government's
authority to impose them, 'Zauderer carries no authority for a mandate unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete
. l messages. 10
commercia

"restraints" on commercial speech and analyzed them under its mid-level test for commercial speech
restrictions, finding that the state had not established a substantial purpose for imposing the restriction because it had not offered evidence that the specialty designation was actually or inherently
misleading. Id. at 139-43. At the end of its opinion, however, the Court addressed the state's alternative claim that, even if it could not prohibit the attorney's speech entirely, it was entitled to reprimand her for failing to publish a disclaimer because her use of the specialty designation was "potentially misleading." Id. at 146. The Court did not directly acknowledge that the state's use of the
alternate means of a disclosure requirement might subject its action to a more lenient, rational basis
review under ZLluderer. Instead, it said that "[i]f the 'protections afforded commercial speech are to
retain their force,"' then "we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the Board's burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,"' which are requirements drawn from the Central
Hudson test that applies to speech restraints. Id. at 146 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1985) (addressing speech restraints),
and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)). Next, however, the Court applied a portion of its
disclosure requirement reasoning in 'Zauderer, finding that the disclaimer at issue was "copiously
detailed," and invalidating it as unduly burdensome. Ibane z, 512 U.S. at 146-47 & n.11. Throughout
its decision , the Court emphasized the state of the record, indicating that, with respect to the disclaimer, its analysis might well have been different had the State been able to "point to any harm that
is potentially real, not purely hypothetical." Id. at 146. The Court noted, as well, that it was unsure
whether use of the disclaimer would have "saved [the attorney] from censure," suggesting that it
viewed the reprimand , in the context of the case, as equivalent to a speech restraint. Id. at 147 n. I 1.
68. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
69. Id. at 460-61.
70. Id. at 490-91 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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In United States v. United Foods, Inc., 11 the Glickman dissenters
joined several justices in the majority to invalidate a federal statutory
requirement that mushroom producers pay an assessment for generic
advertising that was not government speech. 72 Echoing the Glickman
dissenters, the United Foods Court adopted the view that product producers have First Amendment rights that may be infringed by regulatory
actions compelling them to subsidize commercial speech with which
they disagree. In its short opinion, the Court also distinguished Zauderer:
Noting that substantial numbers of potential clients might be misled
by omission of the explanation, the [Zauderer]Court sustained the
requirement as consistent with the State's interest in "preventing deception of consumers." There is no suggestion in the case now before
us that the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of
private persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to
73
make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers.

Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg commented directly on the confusion that the Court's case law and comments have engendered in their
joint dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in a case in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Florida statute imposing disclosure requirements on dentists who practice implant dentistry. 74 The
two justices argued that the Court should "provide lower courts with
guidance on the subject of state-mandated disclaimers," and distinguished Zauderer as insufficient to validate the "government-scripted
disclaimer" at issue in that case. 75
Most recently, eight members of the Court avoided addressing the
outer boundaries of Zauderer's applicability by finding that a disclosure
requirement imposed on bankruptcy attorneys was subject to lenient rational basis review because the government's purpose was to correct
misleading commercial speech. 76 Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing to
resolve the case pursuant to Zauderer, but indicating that he would be
willing to reexamine whether its standard "provide[s] sufficient First
Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosures" in an
.
77
appropnate case.

71. 533U.S.405(2001).
72. Id. at408-409.
73. Id. at 416 (citation omitted). The Justices in the majority were Kennedy, Rehnquist , Stevens, Scalia, Souter and Thomas.
74. Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry , 537 U.S. 1080, 1080 (2002).
75. Id. The Justices also noted that the dentist "also raises doubts about whether the Eleventh
Circuit 's conclusion is consistent with Ibane z." Id.
76. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).
77. Id. at 1342-45 & n.l (expressing doubt that the lesser burden that disclosure requirements
may impose on speakers "justifies an entirely different standard of review for regulations that compel, rather than suppress, commercial speech").
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B. The Consequences of Applying Commercial Speech Restraint Analysis
to Information Disclosure Requirements
Most of the commercial speech jurisprudence has developed in the
context of speech restraints. The general speech-protective trend apparent in these cases, as well as the specific judgments that guide the
Court's application of the prongs of the Central Hudson test, provide
important background that helps to explain the uncertainty in the current
jurisprudence of disclosure requirements. The cases also provide a foreshadowing of the limitations government regulators would face if a majority of the Court were to limit the application of 'Zauderer's deferential
review standard to disclosure requirements imposed to correct deceptive
or misleading commercial speech.
In its most recent articulation, the Court confirmed that "[t]he Central Hudson test is significantly stricter than the rational basis test," 78
which it described as follows:
[W]e ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading . If so, then the speech is not
protected by the First Amendment. If the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, however, we next ask "whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial." If it is, then we "determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted ," and, finally, "whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest." Each of these latter three inquiries
must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found
constitutional. 79

This section discusses the consequences of transposing each of
these "stricter" speech restraint inquiries into the analysis of disclosure
requirements imposed on commercial speech.

l. Deceptive or Misleading Speech

Central Hudson's first prong most obviously incorporates the critical differences the Court has identified between commercial and other
types of speech. Although content discrimination is highly suspect with
respect to non-commercial speech, this prong permits governments to
suppress entirely commercial speech that is "more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it." 80 While a deferential approach to government
judgments could provide wide latitude to restrict commercial speech, the
choice apparent in the speech restraint cases is instead that the Court will
carefully scrutinize a government determination that commercial speech
should be suppressed to protect consumers from being deceived. The
78.
79.
80.
(1980).

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
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Court has clarified that government authority to suppress commercial
speech entirely extends only to speech that is in fact deceptive or "inherently misleading." 81 The Court requires proof to find speech in fact deceptive, 82 and will exercise de novo review to determine whether a
statement is inherently misleading. 83 It has rejected state determinations
that certain advertising claims met either of these standards, noting "the
complete absence of any evidence of deception" 84 and opining that
members of the public are generally sophisticated enough to recognize
the limits of advertising and are not as easily misled as would-be regulators claim them to be. 85
By contrast, the Court tends to accord more deference to government determinations that commercial speech may mislead consumers
when the regulatory means are mandated disclosure rather than restriction of speech. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that disclosure requirements are less burdensome alternatives to restrictions of commercial
speech. Despite use of the same word, the Court in z.auderer seemed to
apply different degrees of deference to the State's assertions that the attorney's speech was "deceptive" according to the remedy the State
sought to apply. 86 Since z.auderer, the Court has changed its wording
somewhat, acknowledging that a government's discretion to impose disclosure requirements extends beyond what is required to justify a speech
restraint, to supplementing speech that is "potentially misleading." 87
While it has seemed to say that, even when imposing a disclosure
requirement, a government regulator must demonstrate the "harms it
recites are real," 88 most recently, eight members of the Court signed on
to a reiteration of z.auderer's conclusion that a "possibility of deception"
may be so "self-evident" that no specific proof by the government regu81. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) ("A
State may not ... completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading.").
82. See id. at 106 ("Given the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present
case, we must reject the contention that petititioner's letterhead is actually misleading.").
83. See id. at 108.
84. Id. at 106.
85. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 105 ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of
petititioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television.");
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977) (rejecting the assumption "that the public is
not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising" as based on an "underestimation of
the public").
86. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (rejecting State's contention that illustrations in advertisements created "unacceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated , or confused " as sufficient to justify suppressing them), with id. at 652- 53 (accepting State' s contention that the attorney 's reference to
"fees" without mention of "costs" was "deceptive" where the remedy was a disclosure requirement).
87. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d I, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007)
("(T]he Court has made a doctrinal refinement, distinguishing in the professional services context
between commercial speech that is inherently or actually misleading and commercial speech that is
only potentially misleading . ... We need not (and do not) decide the issue, but we note that recent
decisions have applied this dichotomy beyond the professional services context.") .
88. Ibanez v. Fla Dep't of Bus. & Prof! Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)) .
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lator is required to justify mandating certain information be disclosed in
connection with commercial speech. 89
But even applying the greater deference to government judgments
that commercial speech has the potential to deceive will not obviously
validate many modern disclosure requirements regulators impose to fulfill objectives other than preventing consumers from being misled by
uncorrected speech. That is, graphic cigarette warnings, calorie counts on
fast food, and statements about the adverse environmental impact of the
products on which they appear do not counter commercial speech the
Court would find has a self-evident "tendency to rnislead." 9 Consequently, were the Court to limit 'Zauderer's deferential review to disclosure requirements that serve the purpose of preventing actual or potential
consumer deception, the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson
test would become relevant to determining the constitutionality of the
many disclosure requirements that serve other regulatory purposes.

°

2. Substantial Purpose

Central Hudson's second prong requires the government to establish a "substantial" purpose for its regulation. 91 It is in this purpose inquiry where a majority of the justices have drawn a sharp line between
unconstitutional and permissible commercial speech regulations. Early
on, the Court rejected what it characterized as the "highly paternalistic
approach" of restricting commercial speech to protect people from "the
reactions it is assumed [they] will have to the free flow of ... infonnation."92 Specifically, governments have often sought to achieve their valid regulatory objective of reducing demand for a product by imposing
advertising restrictions on its producers. Governments' reasons for reducing demand may be to promote public health, 93 to conserve scarce
resources, 94 to stabilize economic activity, 95 or to limit the spread of
"vice" activity. 96 In each instance, the government regulator reasoned
that the advertising it restricted, if allowed, would influence consumer
89. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (quoting Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 652-53).
90. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53); see, e.g., Nat' ] Elec.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2001) (observing that the requirement that products
containing mercury disclose it served the purposes of providing information and protecting the
environment, not preventing consumers from being deceived).
91. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
92. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70
(1976).
93. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (reducing underage smoking); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion) (reducing
alcohol consumption).
94. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560 (conserving electricity).
95. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977) (preventing
"white flight" and blight).
96. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182, 185
( 1999) (noting that the Fifth Circuit labeled gambling as "vice activity").
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activity in a way that would undermine the public interest, even if many
of the individual decisions based on unrestricted advertising might in fact
be in the rational self interest of the individual decisionmaker. 97 That is,
governments have sought to modify consumer behavior because they
have determined that the result of aggregated self interested individual
purchasing behavior would undermine a public interest.
Although the Court has acknowledged that regulating to modify
consumer purchasing behavior to achieve a public purpose is within governments' legitimate authority, it has emphasized that it will view such
regulations with great skepticism when they take the form of speech restrictions. Restricting speech is a constitutionally offensive means of
achieving the government's legitimate citizen "protectiveness" objective
because its effectiveness "rests ... on the advantages of their [citizens]
being kept in ignorance." 98 With increasing vehemence, the Court and
individual justices have condemned the "paternalistic assumption that the
public will use truthful, nonmisleading information unwisely," and the
Court has invalidated speech-suppressing regulations that are based upon
that assumption. 99 The alternative that the Constitution requires speech
restrictions based on the "offensive assumption that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth" 100 is to "open the channels of communication" so that people can be "well enough informed" to "perceive their
own best interests." 101
It is unclear precisely which characteristics of a regulation must exist for particular justices to label a government regulation as unconstitutionally "paternalistic." All of the regulations condemned by the Court
on this basis have restricted commercial speech and some of the troublesome characteristics noted by the Court and individual justices are specific to speech restraints. 102 One troublesome characteristic is that speech
restraints modify consumer behavior by "keep[ing] people in the dark for
... their own good." !0 3 Another is a political process concern that restricting speech "to pursue a nonspeech-related policy" may "screen
from public view the underlying government policy ." 104 Additionally, the
Court continues to emphasize that disclosure requirements are a "far less
97 . See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 387 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Government fears the safety consequences . . . [that] flow from the adverse cumulative
effects of multiple individual decisions each of which may seem perfectly reasonable considered on
its own.").
98.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976).
99. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 503 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85, 96
(1977)).
101. Va. State Bd. of Pharmnc y, 425 U.S. at 770.
102. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad . Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193
(]999).
I 03 . 44 Liquormnrt , 517 U.S. at 503.
104. Id. at 500 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
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restrictive alternative" than advertising restrictions, although it is unclear
the extent to which this conclusion extends beyond correcting "misleading" advertisements. 105
By contrast, some statements by individual justices and combinations of justices suggest a view that the Constitution prohibits the more
general regulation of commercial speech for "paternalistic" behavior
modification purposes. 106 Justice Thomas has most vociferously advocated the view that strict scrutiny should apply to government regulations
that depend on the content of commercial speech, unless the government
can demonstrate that the speech is untruthful or misleading. 107 Other justices have joined in similar reasoning in some cases. 108 Nevertheless,
these justices and others have also emphasized that such content based
purposes are particularly problematic in the context of broad speech restrictions, which they characterized as "blanket bans" that "entirely suppress" speech, ' 09 and that governments may require the disclosure of at
least some types of "beneficial consumer information" without running
afoul of the anti-paternalistic purpose rule that they interpret the Constitution to contain. 11 Consequently, it is unclear how a majority of the
Court would evaluate a disclosure requirement aimed to counter the potentially persuasive, as opposed to deceptive, content of commercial
speech under Central Hudson's second prong.

°

105. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) ("Even if the Government
did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading advertisements , this interest could be satisfied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled with a
warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown.").
106. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 5 I 7 U.S. at 5 I 8 (Thomas, J., concurring) .
107. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco Co . v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44Liquormart ,5 17 U.S. at 518 (Thomas ,
J., concurring).
108. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("(W]hen a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful , nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva tion of a fair bargaining process , there is far Jess reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands ."). By contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice
Breyer's dissent in Thompson, accepting the Federal Drug Administration 's consumer demand
modification purpose for restricting compounded drug advertising. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 382
(Breyer, J., dissenting). This may be because the FDA's restrictions were tailored and not a "complete ban."
l 09. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 5 I 7 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion) ("'[S]pecial care' should
attend the review of ... blanket bans .... ") (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 at 566 n.9); Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm ' n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110 n.17 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("[A]
holding that a total ban is unconstitutional does not necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of
commercial speech."); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care regulations
that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy.").
I JO. 44 Liquormart, 5 I 7 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("When a State regulates commercial
messages to protect consumers from misleading , deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires
the disclosure of beneficial consumer information , the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies Jess than
strict review.").
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3. Directly Advance

Prong three of the Central Hudson test looks to the relationship of
the government's means to its end. 111Speech restrictions must directly
advance the government's substantial purpose for imposing the regulation. 112The Court has applied this test with increasing rigor, questioning
the details of government line-drawing and demanding proof that particular restrictions will actually advance the government objective substantially.113Where government has imposed speech restrictions for the
purpose of reducing demand as the intermediary means to achieving a
public end, the Court has examined closely whether the restriction imposed will actually achieve the specific type of demand reduction the
government asserts. In 44 Liquormart, a four justice plurality refused to
assume, without findings of fact or evidentiary support, that restricting
price advertising of alcohol would "significantly reduce alcohol consumption," finding, among other things, that a lack of such information is
unlikely to deter heavy drinkers. 114In both Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States 115 and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 116
the Court rejected the one-step-at-a-time reasoning, failing to find a close
enough fit between the government's purpose and its means because of
contradictions contained in the overall regulatory schemes for alcohol
and gambling, respectively. 117And in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 118
a plurality similarly rejected the state's assertion that requiring tobacco
advertising be at five feet or higher directly advanced its goal of curbing
minors' demand for cigarettes because, "Not all children are less than 5
feet tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take
in their surroundings." 119 Finally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, 120 the Court seemed to say that restricting advertisements to reduce consumer demand as a means to protect those same consumers
"from making bad decisions with the information" per se does not directly advance the government's interest. 121Obviously, this close examination of means-end fit applied to disclosure requirements would invalidate more of them than the Zauderer rational basis review.
111. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., 44 Uquormart , 517 U.S. at 505.
I 14. Id. (requiring a strong showing by the State because of the "drastic nature of its chosen
means").
115. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
I 16. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
117. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190-93; Rubin , 514 U.S. at 489.
I I 8. 533 U.S. 525 (200 I).
I 19. Id. at 566 (plurality opinion).
120. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
121. Id. at 374-76 ("Even if the Government had asserted an interest in preventing people who
do not need compounded drugs from obtaining those drugs, the statute does not directly advance that
interest. ... [T]he statute does not directly forbid such sales. It instead restricts advertising, of course
not just to those who do not need compounded drugs , but also to individuals who do need compounded drugs and their doctors. ").
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4. Alternate Means
When it reaches the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the
Court inquires whether the regulation is "more extensive than is necessary to serve [the government's] interest." 122 The Court has applied this
requirement increasingly rigorously as well, looking both to whether the
123
restriction imposed is well tailored to the government's purpose, and
to whether alternative types of regulations that do not restrict speech
could adequately accomplish the government's objective. 124 According to
the Court, "[R]egulating speech must be a last-not first-resort." 125 A
number of speech restrictions imposed to reduce consumer demand have
failed this fourth prong inquiry. 126 The Court has consistently indicated
that direct, non-speech regulations are preferable to advertising restrictions, 127 although it has also recited more narrowly tailored speech restrictions as available alternatives that cause the regulation under review
to fail the fourth prong inquiry. 128 In connection with this inquiry, the
Court has frequently mentioned that disclosure requirements are constitutionally preferable, less-restrictive means to speech suppression, 129 and
that governments are free to engage in their own speech to counter the
content of advertisements. 13 Consequently, the extent to which the Court
would invalidate disclosure requirements because even less restrictive

°

122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
123. See Lorillard , 533 U.S. at 563 ("The uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation
demonstrates a lack of tailoring.").
124. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 ("In previous cases addressing this final prong of the Central
Hudson test, we have made clear that if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.").
125. Id. at 373.
126. Id. at 371 (prescription drugs); wrillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (cigarettes); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995) (alcohol).
127. Thompson , 535 U.S. at 372 ("Several non-speech-related means of drawing a line between
compounding and large-scale manufacturing [of drugs] might be possible here."); Rubin, 514 U.S. at
490-91 (one alternative available to prohibiting alcohol content advertising of beer is "directly
limiting the alcohol content of beers"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507
(1996) ("[H]igher prices [for alcohol] can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased
taxation."); Linmark Assoc. , Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (financial incentives to reduce home sales are an available alternative to restricting display of For Sale signs).
128. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490-91 (alternatives to alcohol content advertising for all beer are
"prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength (which is apparently the policy in
some other western nations) , or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors, which is the segment
of the market that allegedly is threatened with a strength war").
129. Thompson , 535 U.S. at 376; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980) (reasoning that in order to address its interest in promoting energy
conservation, the government "might , for example, require that the [utility's] advertisements include
information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service"); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) ("[Dhe preferred remedy is more disclosure , rather than less."); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (suggesting that governments may "require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include
such additional information , warnings, and disclaimers , as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive").
130. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (suggesting the
alternative of government counter-speech).
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means of achieving the government's purpose are available, such as direct regulation or government speech, is unclear.
C. Disclosure Requirements in the Lower Courts

The intersection of the Court's early distinction between commercial speech disclosure requirements and restraints imposed on commercial speech creates a number of open issues with respect to government
authority to mandate speech on product labels.
1. What is the test?
Lower courts have differed as to whether 'Zauderer's rational basis
review applies to all instances where governments mandate disclosure of
commercial information, or whether it is limited to instances where governments act for the purpose of preventing consumer deception.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this question in
a series of recent cases. In International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy
(IDFA), 131 Judges Altimari and McLaughlin held for a two-judge majority that dairy marketers had established a likelihood of success on the
merits of their claim that a Vermont statutory requirement mandating
producers to label certain dairy products-those made from milk derived
from cows treated with the synthetic growth hormone rBST-violated
the Constitution .132 The court applied the Central Hudson test to find the
disclosure requirement likely unconstitutional for lack of a substantial
purpose without explicitly addressing whether 'Zauderer's rational basis
test applied. 133 Judge Leval dissented, also without specifically distinguishing between the tests offered in Central Hudson and 'Zauderer.134
Instead, he argued both that the state's interests were substantial under
Central Hudson, and that 'Zauderer' s distinction between "disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech" rendered the Vermont
·
· · l .135
reqmrement
const1tut10na
Five years later, in National Electrical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Sorrell, 136 a unanimous panel composed of Chief Judge Walker, Judge Pooler and then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor reversed and remanded a district
court decision and ordered preliminarily enjoining application of Vermont statutory and regulatory requirements that manufacturers label
products to indicate they contain mercury and must be disposed of as
hazardous waste.137 The district court relied on the prior decision in
131. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 74.
133. Implicitly, the court seemed to limit 'Zauderer's application to disclosure requirements
aimed at "preventing deception of consumers. " Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
134. Id. at 77- 78 (Leval, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 81.
136. 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
137. ld.at116 .
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IDFA and, applying Central Hudson, found the plaintiff manufacturers'
association likely to succeed on the merits of its constitutional claim. 138
The circuit court directly addressed the different tests articulated in Central Hudson and 'Z.auderer, and held that the district court had "misperceived" which one applied to the disclosure requirement in that case. 139
According to the court, the Free Speech Clause objectives underlying the
distinction between disclosure requirements and restraints on speech
meant that the "reasonable-relationship rule in 'Z.auderer" governed review of the disclosure requirement before it, even though it "was not
intended to prevent 'consumer confusion or deception' per se." 140 The
court explained:
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of accurate, factual , commercial information does not offend the core First
Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information
or protecting individual liberty interests . Such disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth
and contributes to the efficiency of the "marketplace of ideas." Protection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the principal First Amendment justification for protecting commercial
speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that
goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.
Additionally , the individual liberty interests guarded by the First
Amendment , which may be impaired when personal or political
speech is mandated by the state are not ordinarily implicated by
compelled commercial disclosure. Required disclosure of accurate,
factual commercial information presents little risk that the state is
forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions,
suppressing dissent , confounding the speaker's attempt s to participate
in self-governance , or interfering with an individual's right to define
. or her own persona 1·1ty.141
and express h1s

The court thus concluded that "'Z.auderer, not [Central Hudson] , describe[d] the relationship between means and ends demanded by the First
Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases. The Central
Hudson test should be applied to statutes that restrict commercial
speech." 142 It distinguished its prior decision in IDFA as "expressly limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no
interest other than the gratification of 'consumer curiosity,"' noting that
"because our decision in IDFA was predicated on the state's inability to
138. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 72 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456. (D. Vt. 1999).
139. Sorrell, 272 F.3d at I 13.
140. Id. at I 15 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
141. Id. at I 13- 14 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 115.
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identify a sufficient legitimate state interest, we did not reach the proper
relationship between a disclosure regulation's means and its ends, the
issue we face here." 143 It commented as well that applying the Central
Hudson test to government disclosure requirements not aimed specifically at preventing consumer deception would "expose [many] longestablished programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a
result is neither wise nor constitutionally required." 144

In a later decision, with the panel again including Judge Poole and
then-Judge Sotomayor, the court rejected the New York State Restaurant
Association's (NYSRA) argument that New York City's requirement
that restaurants post the calorie content of food should be reviewed under
the Central Hudson test because its purpose was to combat obesity rather
than prevent consumer deception, and because the plaintiff association
disputed that the disclosure requirement would fulfill that purpose. 145 The
court reiterated its Sorrell reasoning "that Zauderer ' s holding was broad
enough to encompass nonmisleading disclosure requirements" 146 and that
"Zauderer, not Central Hudson . .. describes the relationship between
means and ends demanded by the First Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases." 147
The Second Circuit panel noted that "[ w]e have not been alone in
accepting this broader reading," 148 citing the First Circuit's decision in
Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass'n v. Rowe. 149 In that case, the
court applied Zauderer to Maine's statutory requirement that middlemen
entities in the pharmaceutical distribution network disclose certain information about their operations and finances as a condition for doing
business in the state. 150 The court rejected plaintiffs argument that "Zauderer is 'limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at consumers,"' noting that it had "found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a
way." 151 The weight of the lower court precedent, therefore, interprets
the Zauderer rational basis test to apply to disclosure requirements gen-

143. Id. at 115 n.6.
144. Id. at 116 (noting that "[i]nnumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the
disclosure of product and other commercial information ," including reporting of federal election
campaign contributions , securities disclosure s, tobacco labeling , nutritional labeling, reporting of
pollutant concentrations in water, reporting of releases of toxic substances, disclosures in prescription drug advertisements, posting notification of workplace hazard s, warning of potential exposure to
hazardous substances, and disclosure of pesticide formulas) (citations omitted).
145. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA ), 556 F.3d 114, 132- 33 (2d.
Cir. 2009).
146. Id. at 133.
147. Id. (quoting Sorrell , 272 F.3d at I 15) (alteration in original).
148. NYSRA , 556 F.3d at 133
149. 429 F.3d 294 (!st Cir. 2005).
150. ld.at316 .
151. Id. at 310 n.8.
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erally, even if they are not specifically or exclusively aimed at preventing
· 152
consumer deception.
Other courts, however, have applied the Central Hudson test to disclosure requirements, specifically in the context of advertising by lawyers and other professionals, where the Court's decision in Ibanez muddies the precedent. In Borgner v. Brooks, 153 the case in which Justices
154
Thomas and Ginsburg dissented from denial of the writ of certiorari ,
both the district court and the appellate court applied the Central Hudson
test to a state requirement that dentists include a disclaimer with their
advertisements of an implant dentistry specialty. 155 Neither acknowledged the option of lower level review that 'Zauderer presented. 156
In Mason v. Florida Bar, 157 the Eleventh Circuit confronted a state
bar rule that on its face prohibited attorneys from making certain types of
"self laudatory" statements without a lengthy disclaimer in the lawyer's
advertising. 158 Confronted with the state bar's argument that "its restriction on [the plaintiff attorney's] speech should be upheld because it has
not insisted upon an outright ban on speech, but merely requires the use
of a disclaimer," 159 the court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Ibane z to require that "[e]ven partial restrictions on commercial speech
must be supported by a showing of some identifiable harm." 160 It held
"that the Bar is not relieved of its burden to identify a genuine threat of
152. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Assoc. v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286-87 (0. Conn . 2008)
(finding that for review of a required disclosure for bankruptcy attorneys "the reasonable relation test
is more appropriate," but also determining that the required disclo sures are not misleading, are not
overbroad, and "advance[] a sufficiently compelling government interest and do[] not unduly burden
the attorney-client relationship "); European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1371-72 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("IMBRA 's disclo sure requirements are properly analyzed under
'lauderer and must be upheld if there is a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest. ... IMBRA 's disclosure requirements are reasonably related to Congress' legitimate interest in
preventing fraud and deception and addressing domestic abuse and human trafficking against socalled 'ma il-order brides."'); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., Inc., No. EDCV 04-407 -V AP
(SGLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39779, at *36- 39 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2007) (addressing the question
whether strict scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny applied to state statutory requirement that pharmacies conduct and distribut e a bi-yearly rice survey , and concluding that no scrutiny applied because
the statistics were not required to be distributed with advertising materials and so did not burden
commercial speech); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 845 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003) (subjecting EPA rule that require s municipalities to distribute information about the hazards of storm water
run-off to unspecific low level scrutiny); Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar of Tex., 888
F. Supp. 1328, 1357- 59 (E.D. Tex. 1995), ajf'd, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996).
153. 284 F.3d 1204 (I Ith Cir. 2002).
154. Borgner v. Aa. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1210.
156. Id. at 1214 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) for the rule that "[d]isclai mers are significantly different than outright bans on commercial speech," but applying the Central Hudson test); Borgner v. Brooks, 152 F.
Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (2001) (citing 'lauderer, 471 U.S. at 648-49 for the rule that restrictions on
advertising cannot be based on '"uns upported assertions' without 'evide nce or authority of any
kind'").
157. 208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000).
158. Id. at 954.
159. Id. at 958.
160. Id.
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danger simply because it requires a disclaimer, rather than a complete
ban on ... speech," and that the Bar "has failed to satisfy the third prong
of Central Hudson." 161 Similarly, the district court in Schwartz v.
Welch 162 reviewed a series of disclosure requirements imposed on lawyer
advertising under the Central Hudson test, characterizing the rules as
imposing "restrictions" because the requirements caused the lawyerplaintiffs to modify their advertisements and forego certain advertisement techniques. 163A Massachusetts state court recently discussed the
difficulty of analyzing disclosure requirements coupled with an enforcement mechanism present in the context of mandated security offering
registration and disclosure. 164The problem of characterization arises
because the disclosure requirement serves "not to restrict speech, but to
expand it," but the "necessary corollary" of such a scheme is the prohibition of speech without the required disclaimer. 165The enforcement mechanism "inherently restrict[s] speech," but "without such prohibitions it
is difficult to imagine how a ... disclosure system could operate with
any degree of effectiveness." 166
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 167the district
court applied the Central Hudson test to a disclaimer imposed on lawyers.168The appellate court agreed that 'Zauderer applied only to disclosure requirements imposed for the purpose of preventing deception, but
applied that test because it determined that this was the government's
purpose in that case. 169The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
reasoning, 170which meant that it did not resolve whether 'Zauderer' s
"less exacting scrutiny" applies to disclosure requirements imposed for
purposes other than correcting potentially deceptive commercial speech.
Additionally, although the case before it did not depend upon the distinction, the Ninth Circuit recently appears to have assumed that the deception prevention purpose is essential to the application of the 'Zauderer
standard. 171
161. Id.
162. 890 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
163. Id. at 573-74.
164. Bulldog Investors Gen. P'ship v. Galvin , No. 07-1261-BLS2 , 2007 WL 4647112, at *9* IO (Mass. Dec. 26, 2007).
165. Id. at *9- *IO.
166. Id . at *10.
167. 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008).
168. Id. at 796.
169. Id. at 796 ("[R]estrictions on non-deceptive advertising are reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny . . .. The district court in this case reviewed § 528's disclosure requirements under the intermediate scrutiny standard, but we conclude that rational basis review is proper. The disclosure
requirements here, like those in 'Zauderer , are intended to avoid potentially deceptive advertising. ").
170. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, I 339 (2010) (applying the deferential review of 'Zauderer because the statute imposed a disclosure requirement and
because it "is directed at misleading commercial speech ").
171. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Compelled disclosures , justified by the need to 'dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception ,' are pennissible if the 'disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's inter-
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2. Can The Purpose Be "Paternalistic"?
The "paternalism" the Court condemns in the speech restraint cases
involves a three-step ends/means continuum: (1) a government agency
suppresses speech (2) to modify individual buyer/seller transactions (3)
to achieve a public purpose, which is something other than preventing
consumer deception. Steps two and three are commonplace aims of legitimate non-speech regulatory actions. It is the very essence of regulation to restrict the freedom of individual marketplace actors in some instances to serve the democratic government's conception of the public
interest. The many types of public interests served by these actions are
not exclusively, or even primarily, preventing consumer deception.
As noted above, a number of courts have rejected claims by vendors
that Zauderer's rational basis review is limited to disclosure requirements that are intended to protect consumers from deception. 172 These
courts have reasoned that the "free flow of information" value that underpins the protection of commercial speech must extend to render a
government's purpose to provide more information to aid fully informed
consumer decision-making legitimate, even if the regulator did not impose the disclosure requirement to correct affirmatively deceptive or
misleading vendor speech . 173 Extended this far, the reasoning remains
consistent with that articulated by the Court in condemning "paternalistic" speech restraints. 174 Many existing disclosure requirements can be
characterized as intended simply to provide additional information,
which will assist consumers in making decisions that reflect their own
rational self-interests and which the consumers would not know was in
their interest without government mandated disclosure. Requirements
that vendors label products as kosher, 175 as containing ingredients to
which certain consumers may have an allergic reaction, 176 or with safe
handling advice 177 fall into this category.
But many disclosure requirements have purposes that extend beyond merely facilitating the exercise of each individual consumer's raest in preventing deception of customers."' (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))) .
172. See supra text accompanying notes 131-171.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 131- 171.
174. See, e.g., 44 Liquorman , Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484 , 501 (1996) (less than strict
judicial review is appropriate when states "require[] the disclosure of beneficial consumer informa tion").
175. See, e.g., N.Y . AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 201-a(I) , 201-c(l), invalidated by Commack
Self-Service Kosher Meats , Inc. v. Weiss , 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (establishment clause violation).
176. See, e.g., Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. I 08282, 118 Stat. 905 , 905-11 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), available at
http://www .fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/FoodAllergensLabeling/GuidanceComplianceRegulator
ylnformation/ucm I 06187 .htm .
177. See, e.g., Mandatory Safe Handling Statements on Labeling of Raw Meat and Poultry
Products , 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.2, 317.5, 381.125, 381.134 (1994).
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tional self-interest. Often, government regulators impose disclosure requirements for the purpose of modifying the "reactions" that they anticipate consumers will have to un-supplemented advertiser information. 178
Regulators require disclosure because of "a fear that people would make
bad decisions" if given only the information provided by the vendors. 179
That is, an explicit government purpose is to change individual product
purchasing behavior to implement a judgment about "what the government perceives to be their own good," 180 or, often, and more specifically,
what the government has determined is in the public good.
Labeling requirements may be part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that makes clear the consumer behavior modification objective.
Cigarette package labeling requirements exist within a complex structure
of many different federal, state, and local regulations, including direct
marketing restrictions, taxes, and public education efforts aimed at serving the public interest in reducing demand for a product that results in
high social and economic costs. 181 An explicit strategy of cigarette regulations is to change public attitudes about the desirability of the product-to "denormalize" tobacco use. 182
Similar multi-level and multi-faceted regulatory structures with the
underlying agenda of changing public attitudes and purchasing behavior
exist with respect to other products governments have identified as causing harms to public health and resulting in high social and economic
costs. 183 While a requirement that food manufacturers label products with
sodium, sugar, or transfat can be characterized as a government effort to
"open the channels of communication," another, more aggressive, purpose is obvious as well. Each requirement is part of a broader strategy to
promote healthy food consumption, not just any food consumption rational consumers may happen to choose. And the judgment of what constitutes "healthy" food consumption can be controversial. 184 Consequently, many existing labeling requirements depend upon government
authority to require disclosure of information because of the "reactions"
178.
See Rebecca Tushnet , It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 250 & n. 107 (2007) (discussing the "preference-shaping effects" of labeling requirements).
179. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
180.
44 Liquormart , Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
181.
See, e.g., TOBACCOCONTROLLEGALCONSORTIUM,FEDERALREGULATIONOF TOBACCO:
IMPACTON STATEANDLocAL AUTHORITY(2009), available at http ://publichealthlawcenter.org/
topics/tobacco-control/federal-regulation-tobacco/federal-regulation-tobacco-collection.
182. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing
campaign of California Department of Health Services "to 'de normali ze' smoking, by creating a
climate in which smoking would seem less desirable and less socially acceptable .").
183. See, e.g., Penny Starr, First Lady Links Childhood Obesity to National Security in Launch
of 'Let's Move ' Campaign, CNSNEWS.COM, Feb. 09, 2010, http://cn snews.com/news /article/61157
(describing elements of anti-obesity campaign).
184. See, e.g., John Tierney, Diet and Fat: A Severe Case of Mistaken Consensus, N.Y . TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2007 , at Fl (describing controversy about USDA Food Pyramid and advice to eat a low-fat
diet) , available at http://www .brown.ed u/Department s/Eco nomics/Diet %20and%2 0Fa t.pdf.
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it presumes consumers will have to un-supplemented information and for
the purpose of modifying consumer behavior to serve the government's
determination of the public interest. 185
The Second Circuit's three cases all involve labeling requirements
where a government purpose to modify behavior is mixed with the purpose to inform. In IDFA, the panel invalidated a Vermont requirement
that milk manufacturers disclose use of the hormone rBST. 186 Vermont
passed the law because its citizens wanted to know the information. 187
The court held that "consumer curiosity" was not enough to justify imposing the disclosure requirement on the producer's commercial
speech. 188 As the dissent pointed out, milk producers vigorously opposed
the labeling requirement because of the reaction they feared consumers
would have to it. 189 The milk producers also successfully argued that the
information provided should have no impact on a reasonable consumer,
because consumers should only be concerned about health effects of the
hormone on the milk product, and that had not been scientifically demonstrated. 190 That is, milk producers were concerned that consumers
would react irrationally to the information provided at purchase of the
product, despite the fact that the vendors remained free to provide whatever contrary information they wanted, at either that moment or in other
advertising. 191 Specifically, the milk producers conceded the powerful
persuasive effect of information provided at the product purchase moment. By requiring that the government provide a particular showing of
harm in order to require disclosure , the majority interpreted the First
Amendment as granting the milk producers a right of "concealment" in
order to present their persuasive product messages in their own way . 192
The milk labeling controversy helps make clear that what is at stake on
I 85.
Regulators may also seek to influence producer behavior through imposition of labeling
requirements because of the anticipated consumer behavior modification effect. When threatened
with an upcoming trans fat labeling requirements many food producers abando ned using them to
avoid the anticipated reaction of consumers to the disclosur e. See, e.g., LAWRENCE0. GoST!N,
PUBLIC HEALTHLAW: POWER,DUTY, RESTRAINT177 (2000) (describing decision of Kraft Foods to
remove trans fats from Oreo cookies in anticipati on of mandatory labeling); Elise Golan, Fred Kuchler & Barry Krissoff , Do Food labels Make a Difference? ... Sometimes, AMBERWAVES, Nov .
2007 , http ://www. ers. usda. gov I Amber Wa ves/Scri pis/print.asp ?page=/N ovember07 /Features/
FoodLabels.htm.
186. Manufacturers could comply with the law by placing a small blue sticker on their milk , in
conjunction with a sign posted by the retailers indicating that the sticker marked hormone-exposed
milk. Int'I Dairy Foods Ass ' n v. Arnestoy , 92 F.3d 67, 69- 70 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 75- 76 (Leval , J. , dissenting) .
187.
I 88.
Id. at 74 (majority opinion) ("[W]e hold that consumer curiosity alone is not a strong
eno ugh state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate , factual statement in a commer cial context. ") (citation omitted).
189. See id. at 80 (Leval , J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 73 (majority opinion) ("[nhe already extensive record in this case contains no
scie ntific evidence . . . that rBST has any impact at all on dairy products .").
Id. at 80 (Leval, J., dissenting) ("[The manufacturers] do not wish consumers to know that
191.
their milk products were produced by use of rBST because there are consumers who, for various
reaso ns, prefer to avoid rBST. ").
192. See id. at 74, 80.
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both sides of the argument about the extent of government authority to
impose disclosure requirements is the power to influence to modify consumer behavior, not simply to inform it.
The Second Circuit in Sorrell directly acknowledged the consumer
behavior modification objective of the disclosure requirement. 193 The
"overall goal" of the requirement that manufacturers label products containing mercury with content and proper disposal information was not
simply to inform consumers so that they could decide upon their own
rational self-interests and pursue them. Rather, it was "plainly" to pursue
the additional public interest in "reduc[ing] the amount of mercury released into the environment." 194 This purpose, the court noted, was "inextricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of
the presence of mercury in a variety of products." 195 Increasing public
awareness through mandated disclosure had the purpose of "encouraging
... changes in consumer behavior." 196 Although the "change" the court
referred to was in consumers' product disposal behavior, it is not hard to
imagine that the required mercury content disclosures were also for the
purpose of reducing demand for mercury containing products as well.
The court nevertheless explicitly recited the linkage of disclosure requirements, consumer behavior change, and fulfillment of the government purpose as appropriate to demonstrate the reasonable ends-means
relationship required by the Zauderer test. 197
More recently, in reviewing calorie content disclosure requirements
imposed on New York restaurants, the same court found these means
rationally related to the city's purpose "to promote informed consumer
decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associated with
it." 198 Although the court noted that the city was not obliged to produce
evidence to support its decision-making under the rational basis review
applied, it listed much of the evidence the city chose to produce showing
that obesity is a public health problem, that obesity correlates to eating in
restaurants, and that "calorie information is most relevant to obesity prevention. "199 The court thus concluded that the "calorie disclosure rules
are clearly reasonably related to [the city's] goal of reducing obesity." 200

193. See Nat ' ! Elec . Mfrs. Ass' n v. Sorrell , 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id. ("By encouraging such changes in consumer behavior , the labeling requirement is
rationally related to the state ' s goal of reducing mercury contamination. ").
198.
N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir.
2009).
-HOME FOODS:
199. Id. at 136 (quoting THE KEYSTONE FORUM ON AWAY-FROM
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREVENTtN
G WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY (2006)), available at
http://www.fda .gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/ucm082064
.htm.
NYSRA, 556 F.3d at 136.
200.
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These cases illustrate that the "purpose" behind modern labeling requirements is more complex than the discussions in the speech restraint
cases may suggest. Regulators mandate disclosure both to provide information, in the hope that consumers will modify their purchasing behavior
to align with the public interest, and to persuade them to view the public
interest as their own. The government's means of achieving behavior
modification is what is importantly different between the speech restraint
and speech disclosure cases. The "paternalism" of regulating to modify
consumer behavior to achieve a public interest remains the same.
3. Can the Information Be Selected and Presented to Persuade?
The Court in Zauderer distinguished unconstitutional compulsions
that individuals publicize or recite ideological government messages
from the requirement that the attorney include "purely factual and uncontroversial information" with his own commercial speech. 201 Several
courts have evaluated disclosure requirements against this standard,
reaching different conclusions as to whether the disclosure requirement
was unconstitutionally persuasive.
The Seventh Circuit accepted this argument in striking down an Illinois statute that required distributors to place a four square inch "18"
label on "sexually explicit" video games, and to post signs and distribute
brochures explaining the rating system. 202 The state's purpose for the
regulation was "shielding children from indecent sexual material and in
assisting parents in protecting their children from that material." 203 The
court rejected the state's contention that the contents of the label and
signage were similar to the required disclosure of mercury content in
lights, which was upheld by the Second Circuit in Sorrell:
With regard to the "18" sticker requirement , this argument seems to
be plainly unsound. The [state statute] requires that the "18" sticker
be placed on games that meet the statute's definition of "sexually explicit." The State's definition of this term is far more opinion-based
than the question of whether a particular chemical is within any given
product. Even if one assumes that the State's definition of "sexually
explicit" is precise, it is the State's definition-the video game manufacturer or retailer may have an entirely different definition of this
term. Yet the requirement that the "18" sticker be attached to all
games meeting the State's definition forces the game-seller to include
this non-factual information in its message that is the game's packaging. The sticker ultimately communicates a subjective and highly
controversial message-that the game's content is sexually explicit.

201. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
202. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006).
203. Id. at 646.
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This is unlike a surgeon general's warning of the carcinogenic properties of cigarettes, the analogy the State attempts to draw.204

Because it found the speech to be ideological, the court applied
strict scrutiny to invalidate it as not narrowly tailored. It reached the
same conclusions with respect to the signs and brochures explaining the
rating system, finding in addition that these items unconstitutionally required sellers to "communicate endorsement of the [Entertainment Software Rating Board], a non-governmental third party whose message may
be in conflict with that of any particular retailer." 205 The court did not
cite or distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Meese, which upheld
a "propaganda" label on political speech. 206
Outside the context of video game labels, 207 courts have found selective disclosure requirements to meet 'Zauderer's "factual and uncontroversial" requirement. For example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a challenge by municipal units to an EPA rule that required, as a condition to
receiving a permit to discharge waste into waterways, that they "distribute educational materials to the community" about the dangers of storm
water runoff. 208 The court found that "[i]nforrning the public about safe
toxin disposal is non-ideological." 209 The Second Circuit in NYSRA specifically addressed the restaurant association's claim that calorie disclosure was unconstitutionally selective:
NYSRA does not contend that disclosure of calorie information is not
"factual"; it only claims that its member restaurants do not want to
communicate to their customers that calorie amounts should be prioritized among other nutrient amounts, such as those listed in [the]
Nutrition Fact panel. However, the First Amendment does not bar the
204. Id. at 652.
205. Id. at 653.
206. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-85 (1987); see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text. The Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar "18" labeling requirement for violent videos, finding it
inconsistent with "the factual information and deception prevention standards set forth in Zauderer '
after it held that the state could not constitutionally prohibit under 18 year olds from purchasing the
videos. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)) ("Unless the Act can clearly and legally characterize a video game as 'violent' and not
subject to First Amendment protections , the ' 18' sticker does not convey factual information .")
(emphasis added).
207. That the product labeled is, itself, speech , muddies the analysis. See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that video games are
speech). Additionally, ratings systems present an intermediary step between the product information
and the information on the label, which makes the government's selective judgment about the information provided more apparent.
208. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. Id. at 849- 50 (analyzing EPA's administrative rules implementing the Clean Water Act
that require small municipal sewer systems that discharge waste to conduct public education efforts
about the effects of sewer discharges .); see also Nat'! Elec. Mfrs. Ass' n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114
n.5 (2d Cir. 200 I) ("Our decision reaches only required disclosure of factual commercial information [about mercury content].") ; Conn. Bar Ass' n v. U.S., 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008)
(" ln contrast [to the cases involving compelled dissemination of ideological speech], the required
disclosures here are all facts about the bankruptcy process. ").
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City from compelling such "under-inclusive" factual disclosures,
where ... the City's decision to focus its attention on calorie amounts
210
is rational.

Although they involve selective disclosures arguably crafted, at
least in part, to persuade, all of the disclosure requirements addressed by
the courts thus far have involved information that consumers likely
would not know without the disclosure. In challenging the new cigarette
labels, sellers argue that the graphic, colorful labels are more constitutionally offensive because they present information that consumers already know or could be brought to know in a far less eye-catching way,
and so are obviously crafted not to inform but to persuade.2 11 The district
court disagreed, finding that "the government's goal is not to stigmatize
the use of tobacco products on the industry's dime; it is to ensure that the
health risk message is actually seen by consumers in the first instance."212 The court rejected the cigarette manufacturers' proposed
analogy to video game labeling, describing the message required to be
disclosed on the packages as "objective" and as having "not been controversial for many decades." 213As to the required addition of graphic imagery, the court said that it did "not believe that [it] will alter the substance of such messages, at least as a general rule." 214Interestingly, in an
earlier part of the decision, the court accepted the cigarette manufacturers' challenge to a portion of the statute that banned the use of color or
graphics in their labeling or advertising, finding that symbols and "some
uses of color" communicate information in a different, and potentially
more persuasive, way than the black and white text the statute re. 215
quires.
II. THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES

At the same time that it has been reviewing restrictions of commercial speech more rigorously, the Court has been developing a jurisprudence of constitutionally permissible disclosure requirements in the context of abortion. By contrast to the tightening of review of government
regulations and the mixed signals that fuel challenges to commercial
speech disclosure requirements, the abortion disclosure jurisprudence is
relatively unambiguous. In this line of cases, firm answers exist - either
in the Court's terse comments or in the lower courts' more lengthy appli-

210. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).
21 I. Commonwealth Brands v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 531.
214. Id. at 532.
215. Id. at 525. The district court invalidated the "ban on color and graphics in labels and
advertising" for tobacco products under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, which require a "direct" and "no more extensive than is necessary " relationship between the end and means .
Id. at 521, 541.
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cations - to what seems like open questions in the commercial speech
line of cases.
A. The Supreme Court's Informed Consent to Abortion Cases

The abortion disclosure cases began immediately after Roe v.
Wade216 established a constitutional right to choose abortion before fetal
viability. 217In the early cases after the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court
addressed the impact of informed consent provisions on a woman's privacy right, without discussing the impact of the requirements on abortion
providers' free speech rights. 218Under Roe's trimester framework, a state
could not impose a regulation that had a "significant impact on the woman's exercise of her [abortion] right" 219during the first three months of
pregnancy, and could not impose such a regulation for the purpose of
protecting fetal life until the third trimester. 220 Employing this analysis,
the Court reasoned that protecting the woman's health was the only purpose that could support a mandatory information disclosure requirement,
and it scrutinized the pieces of information that states selected for disclosure,221invalidating disclosure requirements that it deemed "not relevant
to [informed] consent" 222and "designed to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth." 223
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 224 a
majority of the Court modified its prior decision in Roe to acknowledge
the existence of a legitimate government interest in protecting fetal life
that attaches at the beginning of the pregnancy, and applied this revision
to uphold disclosure requirements indistinguishable from those it had
invalidated in prior cases. 225The plurality and concurring justices on this
issue wrote separately. 226Only the plurality addressed the abortion pro216. 4IOU.S . 113(1973).
217. Id. at 164---65.
218. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-91 (] 983) (upholding a state consent statute which comported with Belotti II); Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti fl) , 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (concluding a state could require parental consent but only if
the state also provides "an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained"); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti!), 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976) (explaining that a state consent
statute may not create a "parental veto"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
69-70 (1976) (striking down a state statute requiring a husband's written consent).
219. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health , Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983).
220. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
221. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443 (clarifying that a state does not have "unreviewable authority to decide what information a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abortion").
222. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986)
("Under the guise of informed consent , the Act requires the dissemination of information that is not
relevant to such consent , and, thus, it advances no legitimate state interest.").
223.
City of Akron , 462 U.S. at 444.
224. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
225. Id. at 878.
226. Justices O'Co nnor, Kennedy and Souter announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion. Id. at 841. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia and Thomas concurred in the
judgment that the disclosure requirement did not violate the due process clause, but would have
applied rational basis analysis to reach this result. Id. at 967- 69.
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viders' Free Speech Clause claim. 227 While preserving the "essence of
the abortion right," the plurality rejected Roe's trimester framework reasoning and replaced it with an "undue burden" inquiry that applies to
state regulations imposed from the onset of the pregnancy. 228 In determining that the disclosure requirements at issue did not impose an undue
burden on the abortion right, the plurality explicitly rejected prior Court
holdings that only a purpose to protect women's health could support
required disclosure. It held that states may select information and mandate disclosure for the purpose of protecting fetal life and "to persuade
her to choose childbirth over abortion." 229 In discussing the required disclosures that may survive this undue burden analysis, the plurality twice
stated that the disclosures should be "truthful and not misleading." 230
After finding that the disclosure requirements imposed no unconstitutional burden on the prospective abortion consumer, the Casey plurality
briefly addressed the abortion providers' claim that the mandated disclosures violated their Free Speech Clause rights. 231 The plurality first reasoned that the providers' claim acquired no heightened value because of
its articulation in the context of the protected abortion right. 232 With this
put aside, "[a]ll that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the
risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State." 233
The plurality reasoned:
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.234

227.
Id. at 884 (concluding that an abortion provider ' s constitutional right "not to provide
information" extends "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State").
228.
Id. at 876 ("[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the
State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty.").
229.
Id. at 878, 882- 83 (asserting that governments may require that women considering
abortion receive information about "the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the
fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her health," and even when the
information provided "expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion ").
230.
Id. at 882 (prior cases went too far in invalidating disclosure of "truthful , nonmisleading
information").
23 I.
Id. at 884.
232.
Id. ("Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general
matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman's position . The doctor-patient relation
does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified :
the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its own , the doctor-patient
relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus , a requirement that a
doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes , no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information
about any medical procedure .").
Id.
233.
234.
Id. (citations omitted) .
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Although not specifically reviewing a disclosure requirement, the
Court later, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 235 characterized its holding in Casey
to be that "[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman." 236 In addressing the question whether barring a type of procedure imposed an
undue burden on the right to choose abortion, in light of claims that it
was necessary in some circumstances to protect the health of abortion
consumers, it said, "The Court has given state and federal legislatures
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and
scientific uncertainty. " 237

B. Informed Consent in the Lower Courts-Issues and Answers
States have enacted a number of abortion disclosure requirements
since the Court's decision in Casey, and as the Court's commercial
speech and government speech jurisprudences have continued developing. Many of these "informed consent" provisions both go beyond information normally required by the informed consent doctrine and can
reasonably be interpreted as designed to persuade women not to choose
abortion.238 Lower courts have addressed the increasing Free Speech
Clause challenges brought by abortion providers to the disclosure requirements, fleshing out Casey's few sentences to identify the standard
of review and analysis that apply to such claims.
1. The Test is Rational Basis
Lower courts have uniformly interpreted Casey to apply a "reasonable relationship" test to claims by abortion providers that disclosure

requirements violate their free speech rights. 239 Several courts have noted
that the level of review would change if states were to require doctors to
provide patients with state mandated "ideology" instead of factual disclosures.240 Many courts have noted and grafted onto the Free Speech
235. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
236. Id. at 157.
237. Id. at 163.
238. Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion
Law , 76 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 1599, 1609 (2008). According to a recent Guttmacher Institute report
17 states mandate that women be given "counseling" before an abortion that includes information on
at least one of the following: the purported link between abortion and breast cancer (6 states), the
ability of a fetus to feel pain (9 states), long-term mental health consequences for the woman (7
states) or information on the availability of ultrasound (8 states). Commentators argue that at least
some of these provisions should be interpreted to violate the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1609- 12; see
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening , 89 B.U. L. REV.
939, 1007--09 (2009) (provisions violate the rights of the listener); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech , 2007 U. ILL L. REV. 939,
959 (2007) (provisions violate the right of the speaker).
239. This tracks the Court 's language and brief analysis . See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (doctors ' speech subject to "reasonable .. . regulation by the State").
240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th
Cir. 2008) ("Casey and Gonzales establish that the State cannot compel an individual simply to
speak the State's ideological message . .. .").
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Clause test the additional requirement twice articulated by the Casey
plurality in its undue burden analysis that "permissible" disclosure requirements must be "truthful and not misleading." 241
This phraseology parallels language contained in several different
parts of its commercial speech jurisprudence. Central Hudson's first
prong requires that commercial speech be "lawful activity and not be
misleading" to earn entry into the protected category. 242 And, as noted
above, lower courts have interpreted 'Zauderer to require that the content
of mandated disclosure requirements be "factual and uncontroversial." 243
The Supreme Court plurality did not make any of these connections, and
neither have the lower courts. No court has considered applying the full
tests set out in Central Hudson or 'Zauderer to state requirements that
doctors deliver state mandated information along with their own speech.
2. The Purpose Can Be "Paternalistic"
As to legitimate purposes that can support mandated disclosure requirements , courts have applied as binding precedent the Casey plurality's reasoning that either a purpose to protect maternal health or to protect the life of the unborn fetus will suffice. 244 Protecting maternal health
is a purpose consistent with furthering the consumer's rational self interest in self protection. Protecting the life of an unborn fetus is a purpose
that asks the abortion consumer to think beyond herself, to consider how
other beings, and one "being" in particular, will be affected by her decision to undergo the procedure. That is, despite some efforts by the Court
to cast it as a purpose that serves the woman's self interest, 245 protecting
the life of the unborn fetus is a public purpose that may well conflict with
the consumer's rational self interest.
As explained above, the "paternalistic approach" that the Court
condemns in the context of commercial speech restraints involves the
combination of (1) restricting speech, (2) to reduce demand, (3) to serve
a public interest, which is something other than ensuring fully informed
and accurate consumer decision-making. 246 In holding that states may
constitutionally mandate disclosure, in a way "which might cause the
241.
Id. at 746.
242. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
243. See supra Part I.C.3.
244. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he district court concluded that the provisions challenged ... bore a reasonable relationship to the state's goal of promoting childbirth over abortion ....
[T]he district court went on to pronounce that 'were Casey not
binding, I might be inclined to hold that [the statute containing the disclosure requirements] was
passed with an impermissible purpose ....
However , lower courts are bound by Supreme Court
precedent. I do not see how Casey does not control this question ."') (third omission in original).
245.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (stating that information about the fetus is relevant to a woman's "psychological well-being," which "is a facet of
health").
246. See supra Part I.C.2.
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woman to choose childbirth over abortion," and which was enacted for
247
the purpose of "express[ing] a preference for childbirth over abortion,"
the Court has held that steps two and three are constitutional when combined with the means of required disclosure in the context of consumer
decision making with respect to the service of abortion. 248 Lower courts
uniformly understand and apply this principle .
3. The Information Can Be Selected and Presented to Persuade
The Casey plurality was not ambiguous. 249 The lower courts have
interpreted its words to say that states may pursue their legitimate purpose of protecting fetal life by requiring disclosure of information selected to persuade potential abortion consumers to decide against the
procedure. 250 They have also addressed claims by abortion providers that
particular state disclosure requirements go beyond the bounds of permissible state persuasion authorized in Casey, either because they impart
ideology instead of information, or because the information required to
be disclosed is untruthful or misleading. 251
Lower courts have had to address the two prongs of the Casey plurality's reasoning and to reconcile them with the particular statutory provisions under review. These are, first, that the First Amendment would
prohibit a state from mandating that a private individual "simply ...
speak the State's ideological message" 252 and second, that the informational disclosures required by the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey,
even though, at least in part, "designed to persuade [women] to choose
childbirth over abortion," 253 did not do that. Although these courts have
reached different conclusions with respect to the application of Casey's
reasoning to particular types of provisions, they have generally interpreted the precedent to allow government regulators a wide range of discretion both to choose information that abortion providers must present
to potential consumers, and to direct the means of presentation in order
to further the public purpose of reducing demand for a lawful service.

247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 878 (noting that a state measure may be "designed to persuade [a woman] to
choose childbirth over abortion").
250. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[A
State may] use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful , non-misleading
information relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion."); see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446,
495 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing and approving, in the context of undue burden analysis , the district
court's conclusion that Casey directs that "legislation is based on a permissible purpose if it is reasonably related to promoting childbirth over abortion or protecting maternal health") .
251. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735-3 6.
252. Id. at 735.
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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254
In Eubanks v. Schmidt,
the district court noted that the "possible
ideological component" of the informed consent requirement presented
an "interesting and important enough issue." 255After reasoning that, according to its brief discussion, the Casey plurality must have "believed
these [challenged disclosures] to convey information reasonably related
to informed consent, not ideology," the court further observed that "it is
easy to see why some would disagree ." 256The court noted that "a statute
requiring every physician to advise women of their right to have an abortion ... might be equally justified as the one here," but concluded that
"[s]imply because a subject is controversial ... does not make it ideological."257Although "the legislature passed [the statute at issue] to further its preference for birth over abortion," the mandated disclosures "do
not overtly trumpet that preference ." 258Consequently, the court, like the
Supreme Court, viewed them as "merely providing information." 259
The Eubanks court further rejected the abortion providers' claim
that the state statute was invalid because it required providers to pay for
the state-created literature they were also required to distribute. 260Two
other district courts reached the opposite result, reasoning differently as
to both whether a state ideological message was obvious in the disclosure
requirement, and whether abortion providers could constitutionally be
required to pay. In Karlin v. Foust, 261 the court found that the state statutory requirement that abortion providers distribute "state-printed and
county-compiled materials" was "far more than a simple vehicle for information distribution." 262 In its view, the disclosure requirement
"force[d] physicians to associate themselves with the state's anti-abortion
message, a message that is implicit in the information provided even if it
is never stated explicitly." 263Although the court acknowledged that Casey was binding as to the constitutionality of the distribution requirement, it invalidated the additional requirement that the abortion providers
pay for the information. 264
The district court in Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Rile/65 addressed these questions more recently. In its view:

254.
126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
Id. at 458 n.1 1.
255.
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.
259. Id.
260.
Id. at 460 ("(J]t is not clear that requiring the physicians to pay for the pamphlets changes
the constitutional analysis to any extent.").
261. 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
262.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
263.
264.
Id. at 1226. The appellate court did not review the Free Speech Clause part of the holding.
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
265.
274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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The Supreme Court's First Amendment decision in Casey expressly
rejected the notion that a state may require distribution only of ideologically neutral information regarding abortion-that is, information
that not only is truthful and not misleading, but also that does not express a preference in favor of either childbirth or abortion, because
Pennsylvania's challenged informational materials did express a pre266
ference for childbirth over abortion.

After reviewing Supreme Court precedent with respect to compelled
contributions to ideological and commercial speech, 267 the court concluded, like the court in Karlin, that "providers of abortion services constitutionally may be required to distribute the state-prepared materials,
and offer for viewing the state-prepared videotape, advancing policy
positions with which they disagree, i.e., the preference of alternatives to
abortion, but they may not be compelled to finance the production of the
materials and videotape. "268
In the Eighth Circuit, four judicial decisions thus far address South
Dakota's requirement that doctors provide those considering abortion a
writing stating, among other things, "[t]hat the abortion will terminate
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being." 269 The district
court, which was the first court to review the challenge, granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the disclosure requirement,
finding that the abortion providers had established a fair chance of success on their claim that the provision unconstitutionally required them to
"espouse the State's ideology." 270 In a divided decision, a circuit court
panel affirmed. 271 The Eighth Circuit reversed the panel in an 8-4 en
bane decision. 272 Judge Gruender, a dissenter in the original panel, wrote
the court's opinion, reasoning that, although "[t]aken in isolation," the
"human being" disclosure requirement "certainly may be read to make a
point in the debate about the ethics of abortion," it must properly be read
to include its narrowing statutory definition. 273 The two judges from the
266. Id. at 1270; see also id. at 1273 n.10 ("Casey distinguished Wooley by saying that the
distribution of an ideological message under the statute at issue in Casey was required only as a part
of the practice of medicine .... ").
267. The Court had not yet decided Johann s, which held that individuals have no First
Amendment right to avoid targeted taxes that fund government speech with which they disagree.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
268. Summit Med. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
269.
S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS§ 34-23A-10.l(l)(b) (2009).
270.
Planned Parenthood Minn. , N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D. S.D.
2005) ("Unlike the truthful, non-misleading medical and legal information doctors were required to
disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State's viewpoint on an unsettled medical, philosophical , theological , and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus
is a human being.").
271.
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds , 467 F.3d 716, 725 (2006) (statute 's
disclosure provision "forc[es] an abortion provider to recite the state's ideological objections to
abortion").
272.
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
273. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. This "define[s] 'Human being' for the purposes of the informedconsent-to-abortion statute as 'an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens , includ-
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panel majority dissented, joined by two other judges, reasoning more
emphatically than they had in their panel opinion that the "human being"
statement "crosses the constitutional line [between permissible factual
disclosures and impermjssible ideology] by requiring physicians to
communicate metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state interest
in regulating the practice of medicine ."274
The district court on remand granted the state's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the "human being" provision, finding no Free
Speech Clause violation because the statute permitted abortion providers
to explain to patients that the term is biological and not ideological. 275 It
then addressed whether two other challenged disclosure requirements
were "truthful and not misleading ," as the court read Casey to require. 276
Relying upon the state's concession that the required disclosure "[t]hat
the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with th[e] unborn human being" referred to a legal, rather than a biological, relationship between the woman and fetus, the court found it to be untruthful, misleading and thus unconstitutional because such a legal relationship between
born and unborn does not exist as a matter of federal constitutional or
state law. 277 The court also evaluated the statutory requirement that abortion provider s disclose "all known medical risks of the procedure . . .
including . .. [an] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide." 278
Based on a finding that "[d]efendants have produced no evidence ... to
show that it is generally recognized that having an abortion causes an
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide," the court concluded that
"[b]ecause such a risk is not 'known,' the suicide disclosure language of
the statute is untruthful and misleading." 279
Other courts have applied the "truthful and not misleading" requirement to abortion disclosure requirements. In Eubanks, as part of its
Free Speech Clause inquiry, the court determined that photographs of
fetal development included in state produced material met this standard ,
even though some were over-colored and oversized:
True, some of the fetal development photographs are color enhanced
and other photos are enlarged . Even so, the photographs are neither
misleading nor untruthful. Regardless of their size, photographs do
not become misleading so long as the statutorily required scale allows an average person to determine their actual size. Nor does the
ing the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full
ED LAWS§ 34-23A- l ).
gestation .'" Id. at 727 (quotin g S.D. CODIFL
274 . Rounds , 530 F.3d at 743 (Murphy , J., dissenting).
275 . Planned Parenth ood Minn. , N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976- 77 (D . S.D.
2009).
276 . Id. at 977- 78. The court seemed to be applying the Free Speech Clause , although some
language suggests that it was con sidering due process undue burden analysis as well.
277. Id. (first alteration in original).
278 . S.D. CODIFIED LAW§ 34-23A-10 .l ( l )(e)(ii) (2009) .
279.
Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 983 .
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color enhancement make an otherwise accurate depiction misleading.
The pictures provide an accurate rendition of the fetus at various
280
stages of development, as required by the Statute.

In Karlin v. Foust, 281 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that

a statutory requirement that providers inform women seeking abortions
that medical technology was available "to enable a pregnant woman to
view the image or hear the heartbeat of her unborn child" was not false
and misleading, even though it could not actually detect a fetal heartbeat
in the early stages of pregnancy. 282 In Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Siegelman, 283 the district court required the addition of certain other information to render the state-imposed requirement that providers inform a woman "that a nonviable unborn child at more than 19
weeks gestation 'may be able to survive' outside the womb" consistent
with Casey's requirement that the disclosures be "truthful and not misleading. "284
In sum, in the context of informed consent to abortion, lower courts
have applied the Casey precedent to uphold a wide range of information
disclosure requirements against Free Speech Clause challenges by service providers. More explicitly than in the so-called commercial speech
cases, a number of courts and judges have noticed that governments have
selected the particular pieces of information for required disclosure, and,
in some instances, crafted the means of presentation and disclosure for
the purpose of modifying consumer decision making rather than merely
informing it. In this line of cases, the courts uniformly interpret Supreme
Court precedent to require that the court apply deferential review to disclosure requirements imposed on abortion service providers' speech
without respect to whether preventing consumer deception is the government's aim.

Ill THE DEFERENTIAL ABORTION "INFORMED CONSENT" ANALYSIS
CONTROLS COMMERCIAL SPEECH DISCLOSURE CASES

Although the Court has never noted the similarity, the commercial
speech and abortion disclosure cases in fact address the same Free
Speech Clause right.285 Whatever signals various combinations of jus280.
Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
281 .
188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
282.
Id. at 491- 92 (reasoning that "the information required to be conveyed under the fetal
heartbeat provision is neither false nor misleading because the services are available to all women; it
is simply a question of when such services would render useful results").
283 . 227 F.Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
284.
Id. at 1203 (stating that providers "must go beyond a simple mechanical reading of this
provision and provide the woman with the following information: 1) a full and complete definition
of the term 'survive ' in accordance with the physician's good faith clinical judgment ; 2) the nature
of any survival ; 3) survival is merely a possibility; and 4) survival will or may be of extremely
limited duration ").
285.
The right to choose abortion is a constitutionally protected right on the consumer side, and
so the undue burden analysis could perhaps limit what an abortion provider can be compelled to say
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tices may be sending about the continuing vitality of Zauderer and deferential review of commercial speech disclosure requirements, the Court
cannot consistently apply a higher level of scrutiny to disclosure requirements imposed on products and other types of services so long as
the current abortion "informed consent" jurisprudence exists.
Regulatory authority to require disclosures in the contexts of abortion and other services and product sales stems from the same source. 286
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, made precisely this point
when dissenting from one of the Court's early decisions applying Roe to
invalidate persuasive disclosure requirements because of the burden they
placed on the abortion right. 287 According to the dissent:
The rationale for state efforts to regulate the practice of a profession
or vocation is simple: the government is entitled not to trust members
of a profession to police themselves, and accordingly the legislature
may for the most part impose such restrictions on the practice of a
profession or business as it may find necessary to the protection of
the public. This is precisely the rationale for infringing the professional freedom of doctors by imposing disclosure requirements upon
them: "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather
than one which physicians may or may not impose upon them288
selves. "

The Court has repeatedly recognized that lawyer speech to potential
clients, through advertising, is commercial speech. 289 Both of the Court's
primary speech disclosure cases involved lawyer speech. 290 Lawyers are
professionals and doctors are professionals. Both provide information
about their services that may influence a potential client to buy it. Both
types of speech, like commercial speech more generally, have constitutional value primarily because of the information they provide to potential consumers. Again, Justice White in his early dissent, convincingly
linked government regulation of the two types of professional speech,
if the requirement that the woman receive the information poses a significant obstacle to the right to
choose the procedure . See Corbin, supra note 238.
286. States have a general police power to protect consumer and other public interests. Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce allows it to impose disclosure requirements on
sales and services, and includes regulating the abortion procedure. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 166 (2007).
287. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986).
288. Id. at 803 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
289. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus.
and Prof! Regulation , Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); Peel v. Attorney Registration
& Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 99- 101, 110-11 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n , 486
U.S. 466, 468 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 637-38 (1985); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Az ., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
290. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) ("The
parties agree, as do we, that the challenged provisions regulate only commercial speech."); Zouderer, 471 U.S. at 629.
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citing 'Zauderer for the conclusion that the same standard of judicial review should apply to disclosure requirements imposed to regulate all
types of commercial speech:
Were the Court serious about the need for strict scrutiny of regulations that infringe on the 'judgment" of medical professionals,
"structure" their relations with their patients, and amount to "state
medicine," there is no telling how many state and federal statutes (not
to mention principles of state tort law) governing the practice of medicine might be condemned. And of course, there would be no reason
why a concern for professional freedom could be confined to the
medical profession: nothing in the Constitution indicates a preference
for the liberty of doctors over that of lawyers, accountants, bankers,
or brickmakers . Accordingly, if the State may not "structure" the dialogue between doctor and patient, it should also follow that the State
may not, for example, require attorneys to disclose to their clients information concerning the risks of representing the client in a particular proceeding. Of course, we upheld such disclosure requirements
291
only last Term.

In Casey, a Court majority adopted Justice White's proposed interpretation of the appropriate scope of government authority to require
doctors to disclose information in connection with the abortion procedure. 292 Although none of the justices linked the Free Speech Clause
analysis to its lawyer advertising or commercial speech disclosure cases,
the Third Circuit had explicitly characterized the informed consent provision at issue as a disclosure requirement imposed on commercial
speech. 293 More recently, a few other courts and commentators have
noted that the constitutional questions presented by mandated disclosures
of information are similar, whether it is a professional service or a product for sale.294 No court or commentator appears to have addressed the
two lines of cases and reasoned that the Constitution requires more deferential judicial review of abortion disclosures than of disclosure requirements imposed on other types of commercial speech. 295 Because
291.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 802--03 (citing :lauderer, 471 U.S. 626).
292. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
293. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
294. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008) ("Although
:lauderer was decided in the commercial speech context, and Casey in the abortion context, a reasonable relation test was applied in both situations to analyze the constitutionality of factual disclosures by professionals ."); Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 766 (5th Cir. 2008) ; Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 918 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex.
2006)); see also Tushnet , supra note 178, 237 ("We don 't generally think of doctor-patient interactions as instances of commercial speech, but the problems of regulating what can be said about a
service provided for money are very similar.") ; Post, supra note 238, 974-79 (noting the similarity
of the two lines of cases in the context of his argument that certain "informed consent " requirements
should be held to unconstitutionally intrude onto professional speech).
295. If there were to be any difference between the scrutiny applied to disclosure requirement s
imposed on pre-abortion speech as opposed to speech preceding other commercial transactions , the
scrutiny with respect to the doctor-patient interchange should be higher. Abortion is a constitution-
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both lines of cases involve the same type of government action taken
with respect to the same category of speech, the analysis that the Court
applies to commercial speech and abortion disclosure requirements must
be the same.
CONCLUSION

In the context of abortion disclosure, the Supreme Court has held
that governments may, through the means of requiring disclosure of information, pursue purposes other than preventing consumer deception or
even ensuring that the potential abortion consumer receives a free and
unbiased flow of information. The Supreme Court has held that governments may select information and require its disclosure for the purpose
of persuading potential consumers to eschew the procedure. That is, governments may provide information to influence consumer reactions for
the purpose of reducing demand for a lawful product. Additionally, lower
courts have held that governments may present information likely already known to the consumer in vivid, eye-catching ways that make the
purpose to persuade even more apparent.
All of these holdings provide firm answers to the cigarette manufacturers' allegation that graphic labels unconstitutionally compel them to
deliver government speech, as it does to similar challenges that may be
mounted by other types of commercial speakers. The Constitution allows
the government to select and compel the delivery of information in connection with commercial transactions for the purpose of modifying consumer behavior, and, more specifically, for the purpose of persuading
consumers to avoid the purchase entirely. Unless and until the informed
consent to abortion jurisprudence changes, product vendors who argue
that only a government purpose to prevent deception can justify a disclosure requirement imposed on their commercial speech have no case.

ally protected right , which could mean it would add weight to the listener's interest in avoiding
government speech choices . See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. And, doctors are professionals, which may
add weight to their interest in avoiding impositions on their patient counseling speech. See Post,
supra note 238, 974- 78.

